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Chapter 1
Bootstrap Overidentifying Test in
Dynamic Panel Data Models
1.1 Introduction
Many economic relationships are in nature dynamic, i.e. the effect of the past on the
present can not be neglected. And more and more application of the panel data models
also tells us that panel models allow the researcher to better understand the dynamics
of adjustment. The dynamic panel data(DPD) models seem to be good consideration.
However, with lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables, strict exogeneity
of regressors no longer holds, making the estimation of DPD models more complicated
than static models. It has been shown that several kinds of estimators under GMM
framework are found to be better in this case. Many researchers, such as Anderson
and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn and Schmidt (1995, 1997) etc.
explored various GMM estimators, which are shown to perform well in dynamic panel
models, while during the GMM estimation, the number of instruments is one of the
crucial parameters to choose. Hahn (1997) also showed that the GMM estimator with
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an increasing set of instruments attains the semiparametric efficiency bound of the
model.
Does this mean that the more instruments there are, the more efficient GMM estima-
tors are? No, not really. Tauchen (1986) found that with T = 50 or 75, there is a
tradeoff between efficiency and bias as the number of moment conditions increase and
thus he concluded that short lag lengths are preferred to longer ones in small samples.
Andersen and Sφrensen (1996) argued GMM using too few instruments is just as bad
as using too many instruments. Ziliak (1997) then asks whether the tradeoff is still
binding in large samples, say, larger than 500 and he performs an extensive set of Monte
Carlo experiments for a dynamic panel data model and finds that the bias/efficiency
tradeoff still exists. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) are also motivated by the
finite sample bias in panel data instrumental variable estimators when the instruments
are weak. They found that the dynamic panel model generates many overidentifying
restrictions even for moderate T.
So it seems crucial to select the proper size of instruments and also that the test of
overidentification should be considered. The most commonly used test of overidenti-
fying restrictions is initiated by Sargan (1958), then improved by Hansen (1982) and
it is also called the J test. According to them, the test statistic is the number of
observations multiplied the minimized GMM criterion, which asymptotically has a χ2
distribution with the degree of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restric-
tions. However, under the panel framework, while this test is imposed, only the GMM
minimand is used as the test statistic is supposed to have the same asymptotic distri-
bution. One of the reasons why the number of observations in the panel data model is
absent is that usually NT is so large that it will make the test statistic always large,
thus increasing the size of the test. However, Bowsher (2002) found that in AR(1)
dynamic panel data models, Sargan test based on the full instrument set as Blundell
and Bond (1998) behaves so badly that it never rejects the null when the number of
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moment conditions becomes too large for a given value of N even for moderate values of
T. So the test can be very undersized and possesses extremely poor power properties.
Bootstrap is a good consideration as an alternative to inference based on parametric
assumptions when those assumptions are in doubt. Just as Hall stated in his book,
”Bootstrap methods are potentially superior to large sample techniques for small sam-
ple sizes.”
In the framework of the panel data model, Kapetanios (2008) suggested resampling
the whole cross-sectional units with replacement which is proved to provide asymptotic
refinements and outperforms block bootstrap in case where there is no cross sectional
dependence but temporal dependence. Bischof (2009) showed cross-sectional bootstrap
is a powerful alternative for calculating standard errors when the variance is inadequate
for addressing difficult pattern of serial correlation, unless T >> N or in datasets where
contemporaneous correlation is the most pressing issue.
There is another crucial parameter to choose during GMM estimation which is the
weighting matrix. While heterogeneity and autocorrelation are one of the typical char-
acteristics for most macroeconomic and some financial series. Economic theory often
provides information about the specification of moment conditions, but not necessar-
ily about the dependence structure of the moment conditions. This has prompted the
development of the class of Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC)
Covariance estimators which are consistent under relatively weak assumptions on the
dependence structure of the process. Additionally, Inoue and Shintani (2005) showed
that the overlapping block bootstrap based on HAC covariance matrix estimators pro-
vides asymptotic refinements. In this paper a cross-sectional bootstrap based on HAC
covariance matrix estimator will be conducted in a dynamic panel DGP and only linear
moment conditions are considered.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2 I will first introduce a general dynamic
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panel data model and the HAC covariance matrix GMM estimator, then make a claim
for the overidentifying test in models without cross-sectional dependence; section 3
mainly deal with the bootstrap, describing the procedure and showing the asymptotic
properties of it; Monte Carlo simulations are conducted in section 4 and section 5 will
conclude.
1.2 The Model and Overidentifying Restriction
Test
1.2.1 The Model and HAC Covariance Estimator
Consider a general panel model
yit = x′itθ + uit, i = 1, ...,N; t = 1, ..., T (1.1)
where xit = (x1it, ..., xpit) is the explanatory variables of dimension p, uit is the error
term and θ is the parameter of our interest. For GMM estimation we should also
introduce a q−dimensional instrument variable zit which satisfies
E(zituit) = 0, (1.2)
In dynamic panel data models xit is comprised of lagged values of yit and exogenous
variables, zit is mainly lagged value of yit and q should be larger than p for overiden-
tification.
We also define Y = (y1, ..., yi, ..., yN) = (y.1, ..., y.t, ..., y.T)′, X = (x1, ..., xi, ..., xN) =
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(x.1, ..., x.t, ..., x.T)′, u = (u1, ..., ui, ..., uN) = (u.1, ..., u.t, ..., u.T)′, Z =
(z1, ..., zi, ..., zN) = (z.1, ..., z.t, ..., z.T)′, where yi = (yi1, ..., yit, ..., yiT)′, xi =
(xi1, ..., xit, ..., xiT)′ and ui = (ui1, ..., uit, ..., uiT)′.
Equation (2) is also named sample moment condition in GMM estimation and in this
paper only linear moment conditions are considered. The 2-step GMM estimation of
θ using HAC covariance matrix is based on the sample moment condition in equation
(1). We first obtain the first-step estimator θ˜ by minimizing
[
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
zituit
]′
WNT
[
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
zituit
]
(1.3)
where WNT is a qNT× qNT positive semi-definite matrix, which may be a simple but
not optimal weighting matrix, for example, the identity matrix I. And also estimate
SˆHAC based on the residuals as
SˆHAC = Γˆ0 +
l
∑
j=1
ωj,l(Γˆj + Γˆ′j),
where l denotes the lag truncation parameter, ωj,l is the kernel function which weights
down autocovariance estimates with large j. ωj,l = 0 for j > b(l) with the bandwidth
b(l)→ ∞ as l→ ∞. Secondly, estimate the second-step estimator θˆ by minimizing
[
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
zituit
]′
Sˆ−1HAC
[
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
zituit
]
(1.4)
and the estimator can be written as
θˆ =
(
X′ZSˆ−1HACZ
′X
)−1
X′ZSˆ−1HACZ
′Y.
The properties of several HAC estimators are analyzed and compared in the literature,
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such as White (1987), White and Domowitz (1984) and Donald and Andrews (1991).
They have established the consistency of such estimators, while in Andrews (1991),
the consistency applies to more general conditions with respect to the class of kernels
with unbounded support and to allowable rate of increase of bandwidth parameter
sequences.
1.2.2 The Overidentifying Restriction Test: J test
In non-panel data models, the J test is based on the sample moment conditions, which
is also the null hypothesis
E[ziui(θˆ)] = 0, i = 1, ...,N.
And the J test statistic is
J = NQ(θˆ) = N−1u(ˆ`)′ZWZ′u(ˆ`)
where Q(θˆ) is the GMM minimand and under the null hypothesis, J has a chi-square
distribution with the degree of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restric-
tions.
While in a panel data model, the dimensions of u and Z are NT × 1 and NT × q
respectively. In order to get nice asymptotic property according to the central limit
theory and its lemma, the J test statistic should be set as
J = NTQ(θˆ).
However, in almost all panel literatures such as Baltagi(2004), when J test is imposed,
only the GMM minimand is tested, i.e. without NT in J above. And those J test
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statistics behave usually too badly to obtain nice size or power property.
I would claim for a N× T cross-sectional independent panel data set, the J test statistic
should be
J = NQ(θˆ) = N−1u′(ˆ`)ZWZ′u(ˆ`). (1.5)
To show the asymptotic properties of J, several assumptions should be made as follows
• Assumption 2.1 The process (x′it, yit, z′it)′ ∈ Rp+1+q is strictly stationary and
ergodic;
• Assumption 2.2 The regressors xit are covariance stationary, independent of
the errors, uis for all t and s and Xi are independent across i;
• Assumption 2.3 The instruments zit with absolutely summable autocovariances
satisfies E(zituit) = 0 and E(u2itz
′
itzit) is finite. E(zitx
′
it) has full column rank;
• Assumption 2.4 The regressors xit have finite fourth moments. E(uit) = 0,
E(uitujs) = 0, for all i , j, t , s, E(uiu′i) = Σi.
• Assumption 2.5 The slope individual-specific coefficients, θi are restricted to
be equal to the panel slope coefficient, θ.
Remark 2.1 The above assumptions are relatively mild and the main restrictions
addressed are independence across cross-sectional units and the exogeneity which are
mainly needed for underlying GMM estimation.
With those assumptions, the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2.1 Under Assumption 2.1-2.5, for fixed T and N → ∞, the J test
statistic, as defined in equation (5), J → χ2N(q−p) . Further more, as T → ∞ and
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N → ∞ sequentially, TJ→ χ2N(q−p).
Proof The GMM minimand is
Q(θ) =
N
∑
i=1
N−1u′i(θ)ZiWiN
−1Z′iui(θ)
Plug ui(θ) = yi − x′iθ into it, we can obtain
Q(θ) = N−2
N
∑
i=1
{y′iZiWiZ′iyi + θ′X′iZiWiZ′iXiθ − 2y′iZiWiZ′iXiθ}
The customary first-order condition for minimizing is
∂Q(θ)
∂θ
= 0
for θˆ, it yields the equation
N
∑
i=1
(
N−1X′iZi
)
Wi
(
N−1Z′iui(θˆ)
)
= 0
with the asymptotic counterparts as
N
∑
i=1
(
E(xitz′it)
)
Wi (E(zituit)) = 0
Define Fi = W1/2i E(z
′
itxit) with W
1/2
i a ”root” of Wi such that Wi = W
1/2′
i W
1/2
i and
to ensure identification, rank{Fi} = p, then re-write the population moment condition
as
F′iW
1/2
i E(zituit) = 0,
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multiplying these p equations from the left by the projection matrix yields
Fi(F′i Fi)
−1F′iW
1/2
i E(zituit) = 0
These are q equations but only p are linearly independent, as rank{Fi(F′i Fi)−1F′i } =
rank{Fi} = p, then it follows immediately that
(
Iq − Fi(F′i Fi)−1F′i
)
W1/2i E(zituit) = 0 (1.6)
which constitutes a set of (q− p) linearly independent equations. And what’s more,
according to Assumption 2.5, Yi = X′iθ + ui, we can obtain
θˆ =
(
N
∑
i=1
X
′
iZiWiZ
′
iXi
)−1( N
∑
i=1
X
′
iZiWiZ
′
iYi
)
= θ +
(
N
∑
i=1
X
′
iZiWiZ
′
iXi
)−1( N
∑
i=1
X
′
iZiWiZ
′
iui
)
So the error term can be represented
u(θˆ) = u +
N
∑
i=1
X
′
iθ −
N
∑
i=1
X
′
i θˆ
= u−
N
∑
i=1
Xi(F
′
i Fi)
−1F
′
iW
1/2
i N
−1Ziui
Remember the J test statistic here is J = N∑Ni=1 u
′
i(θˆ)Z
′
iWiZ
′
iui(θˆ) and let Ji =
Nu
′
i(θˆ)Z
′
iWiZ
′
iui(θˆ), so
J1/2i = N
1/2W1/2i Z
′
iui(θˆ)
= N1/2W1/2i Z
′
iui − N1/2W1/2i Z
′
iXi(F
′
F)−1F
′
W1/2i Z
′
iui
= N1/2(Iq − Fi(F′i Fi)−1F
′
i )W
1/2
i Z
′
iui
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Following CLT together with equation (6), for fixed T when N → ∞,
J1/2i → N(0, S);
where S is a certain semipositive definite matrix. And thus Ji → χ2q−p. Together with
Assumption 2.2, J→ χ2N(q−p). 
1.3 Bootstrap Procedure and Asymptotic Theory
1.3.1 Bootstrap Procedure
For a panel dataset there are in general three resampling schemes, temporal resam-
pling, cross-sectional resampling and a combined resampling. The method used in the
paper is cross-sectional bootstrap as suggested by Kapetanios (2008). As is usual in
bootstrap literature, we will also use the superscript star notation in all resampled data.
Definition 3.1 For a T × N matrix of random variables B, cross-sectional re-
sampling is defined as the operation of constructing a T × N∗ matrix B∗ where the
columns of B∗ are a random resample with replacement of blocks of the columns of B
and N∗ is not necessarily equal to N.
And dealing with the non-parametric bootstrap, for the panel data model defined
in equation (1), cross-sectional resampling will draw columns of Y, X and Z with
replacement, that is, Y∗ = (yi1 , ..., yii , ..., yiN) with the elements of vectors of indices
(i1, ..., ii, ..., iN)′ obtained drawing replacement from (1, ...,N)′. And the same scheme
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is used to obtain X∗ and Z∗. We use the following cross sectional bootstrap procedures:
1. Let N1,N2, ...,NB be iid uniform random variables on {0, 1 ,..., N} and let
(x∗′b , y
∗
b , z
∗′
b )
′ of sample size of Nb × T, b = 1, ..., B be the resampling from
{xi, yi, zi} |Ni=1 with replacement.
2. Calculate 1-step bootstrap GMM estimator θ˜∗ by minimizing bootstrapped (2)
and calculate Sˆ∗HAC based on the residuals;
3. Obtain 2-step bootstrap GMM estimator θˆ∗ by minimizing bootstrapped (3)
using Sˆ∗HAC;
4. Obtain the bootstrapped J test statistic as
J∗ = N
N
∑
i=1
u∗
′
i (θˆ)Z
∗′
i Sˆ
∗−1
i,HACZ
∗′
i u
∗
i (θˆ).
By repeating 1-4 B times, where B should be sufficiently large, one can approximate
the finite sample distributions of the J test statistic by the empirical distributions of
their bootstrap version.
1.3.2 Asymptotic Theory
The bootstrap improvement can be explained in terms of Edgeworth expansions, just
as done by Singh (1981), Hall (1986) and Beran (1988).
Inoue & Shintani (2006) have shown that the empirical distribution of bootstrapped
J test statistic based on HAC covariance matrix estimators can be approximated
by their Edgeworth expansions. As the asymptotic properties of bootstrapping is
independent of the size of bootstrapping blocks, we can rely on the proof that they
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made in the paper. Define k as the characteristic exponent of the kernel function ω,
i.e. the largest number such that limx→∞ 1−ω(x)pxpk ∈ [0,∞). After making regularity
assumptions of the moment conditions, the lag of truncation l, the kernel functions
and the characteristic function of (z′it, uit) satisfying Cramer’s condition, they obtained
the following results.
1. The approximation errors made by the first-order asymptotic theory for the J
test statistics are of order O(lN−1) +O(l−k);
2. The bootstrapped J test statistics can be approximated by Edgeworth expansions
and the errors are of order op(lN−1) +Op(l−k);
3. The approximation error Op(l−k) is due to the bias of HAC estimation and
bootstrap can provide asymptotic refinement only if O(lN−1) = o(l−q), together
with the assumption that l = Op(T1/3), proposed by White and Domowitz
(1984) to solve the problem of consistency, it implies that k ≥ 2 1, i.e. in
the estimation of HAC covariance matrix, the characteristic exponent of the
kernel function should be larger than 2, for example, the truncated kernel, the
trapezoidal kernel and the Parzen (b) kernel;
4. Once k ≥ 2 is satisfied, the approximation error of bootstrap, op(lN−1) is smaller
than that of the first-order asymptotic, O(lN−1);
5. The non-positive semidefiniteness of HAC covariance matrix is still a very trou-
bling issue to solve.
Based on the results above, the following theorem can be obtained,
Theorem 3.1 For fixed T, when N → ∞, the cross sectional bootstrap estimation
of the distribution of J is op(lN−1) + Op(l−k). What’s more, with kernel functions
1The proof can be found in the appendix.
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with characteristic exponent larger than 2, the cross-sectional bootstrap can provide
asymptotic refinement. And with N → ∞ and T → ∞ sequentially, the bootstrapped
errors become op(lN−1T−1).
Proof Just as the second part in the proof of Theorem 2.1 TJ∗ → χ2(q−p). Then the
results just follows as the case with fixed T.
1.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, I conduct experiments to examine the small sample properties of the
cross-sectional bootstrap J test. An individual fixed effect AR(1)dynamic panel data
generating process(DGP) is defined as
yit = γyi,t−1 + βxit + αi + uit
xit = ρxi,t−1 + vit, i = 1, ...,N; t = 1, ..., T
where the error terms uit ∼ NID(0, 1) and vit ∼ NID(0, 1), αi is the individual fix
effect which introduces the individual dependence and later in the second experiment a
similar time fix effect will be also considered to check the performance of my bootstrap
with cross-sectional dependence. The sample size is quite small with N = 20 and
T = 10. The instruments zit are chosen as (yi,t−1, yi,t−2), thus q− p = 1. In order
to get a consistent estimator of HAC covariance matrix the kernel function and the
bandwidth bt should be chosen carefully. In my first experiment, I will compare the
performance of my bootstrap with different kernels. As for the bandwidth, people
argued it is a much more important determinant of the finite sample properties of
SHAC. Andrews (1991) shows that the asymptotic mean square error is minimized by
setting bT = O(T1/3) for the Bartlett weights and bT = O(T1/5) for both the Parzen
and Quadratic Spectral weights, which unfortunately provides little practical guidance.
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Table 1.1: Empirical size of bootstrap J test with different kernels
Nominal level Bootstrap test
Bartlett Kernel
0.1 0.092
0.05 0.048
0.001 0.0018 *
Truncated Kernel
0.1 0.08*
0.05 0.052
0.001 0.002*
Parzen Kernel
0.1 0.096
0.05 0.044*
0.001 0.008*
Newey and West (1994) propose a nonparametric method for selecting the bandwidth
and show it minimizes the asymptotic mean square error criterion, which is now widely
used in different packages and I will also select the bandwidth via this procedure.
Table 1 describes the results of the cross-sectional bootstrap using HAC covariance
matrix estimated by different kernels, Bartlett kernel, truncated kernel and Parzen
kernel. There are 200 bootstraps and 500 Monte Carlo, the auto-regression coefficient
of yit, γ is set to be 0.1, β = 0.9, ρ = 0.1. The results show that Bartlett kernel
outperforms the other two, which are also not extremely bad, just as Newey and West
(1994) conclude that the choice between the kernels is not particularly important
estimation of SHAC.
Secondly, I conduct different experiments to examine the sensitivity of my bootstrap
procedure against different parameter settings and compare the performance to Arel-
lano and Bond (A&B) GMM estimation, the results are illustrated in Table 2. Gener-
ally my bootstrap is superior to that with A&B estimation where all the asymptotic
levels are significantly different from the nominal level at 10%, just as people detected
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Table 1.2: Size properties sensitivity analysis
Nominal level HAC GMM Bootstrap test GMM bootstrap test
200 Bootstraps, 500 Monte Carlo
0.1 0.092 0.16*
0.05 0.048 0.07*
0.001 0.0018* 0.026*
γ = 0.9
0.1 0.064* 0.034*
0.05 0.042* 0.073*
0.001 0.004* 0.006*
Twoway fix-effect DGP
0.1 0.102 0.17*
0.05 0.048 0.07*
0.001 0.01 0.016*
400 Bootstraps, 800 Monte Carlo
0.1 0.0925 0.14*
0.05 0.0475 0.069*
0.001 0.0075* 0.005*
before, the J test statistic with A&B estimation is seriously distorted, according to
my results, quite oversized. As for the sensitivity analysis,firstly I increase the auto-
regression coefficient γ from 0.1 to 0.9, and the results become worse, exactly speaking
very oversized at significant level 10% and 1% and undersized at 5%. Then I add a
time fix effect in the DGP to create cross sectional dependence. To my surprise, the
results are not so bad as I imagine and even better than that of the one way effect
DGP. I would the reason for that may be that the way of introducing the cross sec-
tional dependence is so weak that it is not dominated or may easily diminish during the
process of estimation. At last, I increase the number of bootstraps and Monte Carlo
to 400 and 800 to check whether the results are improved, while the improvement can
be seen very clearly.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I suggest in cross-sectional independent dynamic panel data model, the
overidentifying test, J test statistic as the GMM minimand multiplied by the number
of cross section units, which is shown to have a χ2 asymptotic distribution with the de-
gree of freedom of the number of overidentifying restrictions for fixed T. As usually the
dependence structure of the moment conditions is unknown, the HAC covariance ma-
trix is chosen as the weighting matrix in GMM estimation. Inoue and Shintani(2006)
has shown the bootstrap with HAC GMM estimator can provide asymptotic refine-
ment but only for kernel functions with characteristic exponent larger than 2. I also
propose a cross sectional bootstrap scheme based on HAC covariance matrix estima-
tors and by Monte Carlo simulations, the proposed test statistic is shown to have nice
size properties and the Bartlett kernel function seems to perform best. It is suggested
that this scheme of J test can be used in dynamic panel data where there is weak or
even no cross-sectional dependence and relatively small auto regression coefficients.
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Chapter 2
Utility Payments Indiscipline and
Its Determinants in Russia
2.1 Introduction
The issue of poor payment discipline for utilities in Russia and some former Soviet-
Union countries has been discussed particularly in Russian media. The problem ap-
peared after the collapse of the Soviet Union, before which the utilities sector had been
heavily subsidized and households had to pay relatively low fees. After support from
the government to the sector faded and the infrastructure has become shabby, fees have
started to increase but the industry particularly in Russia came across the problem
of low payment discipline, which allows neither to invest in infrastructure renewal nor
to keep the sector viable. Currently, Russian government is trying to attract private
investments to the sector but this has been difficult to implement due to low payment
discipline and subsequent lower than necessary payment collection rates.
In the current study we use detailed panel data on Russian households to analyze
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incidence of non-payments for household utilities and try to find out if households
with payment arrears have special systematic characteristics. As far as the issue of
type of households with payments arrears in Russia, it has not been analyzed in detail
so far. Additionally, benefits and discounts on housing payments and on the contrary
punishment policies can be better targeted if features of households having relatively
systematic difficulties with timely payment are identified and better understood.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we will briefly review the literature that addressed
various issues related to the utilities sector in transition countries. Then, we provide
description of the data used in the study and discuss characteristics of the sample.
After econometric specification is defined, we discuss our findings and conclude the
study.
2.2 Utility Payments in Russia and CIS
As it is explained in detail in the World Bank report on infrastructure in transition
countries1 the problem of poor payment discipline for utility services appeared in most
of transition economies after the practice of subsidizing operations of state-run utility
service providers was stopped following the collapse of Soviet Union. Since the problem
of poor payment discipline emerged, governments of newly independent states have
resorted to various measures to increase collection rates and turn provision of utility
services into a self-sustaining industry. It is hard to state with confidence if this has
been achieved so far, since according to recent research on affordability in Russian and
transition countries, poor payment discipline still appears to be an issue to various
extent in these countries (Fankhauser and Tepic (2005)).
The issue of poor payment discipline for utilities, affordability of services and other
1Infrastructure in Europe and Central Asia Region – Approaches to Sustainable Services. World
Bank, June 2006.
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related issues in Russia and former communist countries in general have been discussed
by several researchers. For instance, Fankhauser and Tepic (2005) analyze current and
future affordability for utility services in a number of transition countries including
Russia. They conclude that households in transition economies on average are able
to pay utility bills without much difficulty. Affordability is still a problem in certain
countries and particularly for low-income groups, though they admit that this is a
complex issue and straightforward conclusions about affordability are hard to make.
Both Fankhauser et al. (2008) and Bashmakov (2004) suggest that affordability may
get worse in coming future, since attempts are being made to transform utility ser-
vices sector into a financially viable one and large scale investments are necessary for
refurbishment and improvement of current poor infrastructure.
The issue of collection rates, when private investments are interested in the sector
is certainly of foremost importance. According to Bashmakov (2005) collection rates
should be kept at the level of 95%, so that costs are covered, but average collection
rates over the whole Russia have been around 85-90% between 1999 and 2004, which
is apparently insufficient. Bashmakov (2004) determines threshold level of growth
rates for utility payments in Russia, after passing which collection rates start to fall.
This question is mainly important for private sector businesses entering the sector,
which will be expecting return to their investments in infrastructure improvement. He
determines critical growth rates for utility payments, which start affecting collection
rates and claims that they are stable across the population and for various countries.
Hamilton et al. (2008) analyze relevant issue of household subsidies in Russia using a
nationally representative survey, NOBUS, conducted in 2003. They find that currently
housing allowances are not targeted efficiently. They also establish that availability of
housing subsidies vary across regions. Additionally, urban households were found to
be more likely to receive housing subsidies than rural households.
A similar study analyzing housing subsidies and utility payments but in neighbor-
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ing to Russia Ukraine, which also suffers from low payment discipline, was done by
Fankhauser et al. (2008). They find that affordability of utility services improves with
income and size of a household. As in case of Hamilton et al. (2008) for Russia, they
also find that subsidy targeting used currently in Ukraine does not appear efficient. In
Ukraine, interestingly, industrialized regions in Central and Eastern part of the coun-
try including well-off capital city Kiev, in addition to poor regions of the country, have
high incidence of arrears in utility payments. Additionally, households in urban areas,
families with older members and households, where the first respondent is a woman,
are more likely to have problems with timely payment for utilities.
Lampieti et al. (2001) study the effect of increase in electricity tariffs on payments by
poor and non-poor households in late 1990s in another former Soviet Union country,
Armenia. After tariff rise, electricity consumption fell both among poor and non-poor
households, while the average monthly bill increased. Consequently, collection rates
significantly fell due to both increase in the size of arrears and rise in the number of
households not paying bills on time. After tariff rise, number of households classified
as “non-poor” but at the same time carrying arrears increased from 22 to 37 percent of
the total number of non-poor households, while number of poor households carrying
arrears increased from 27 to 46 percent of all poor households. This indicates that
households in Armenia are quite sensitive to rise in tariffs, which on the other hand
might be crucial for further stable functioning of the utility services sector.
Our contribution in current work is to provide more understanding to what type of
families are actually prone to have problems with timely payment for utilities in Russia
by analyzing data on non-payments and various household characteristics. Considering
repeated findings that housing subsidy programs in transition countries are not effi-
cient, our findings may provide additional help to better tailoring future adjustments
to assistance programs. Moreover, results may suggest what type of household cate-
gories are under pressure, as far as punishment policies for systematic non-payments
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are concerned.
2.3 Data and Sample Characteristics
We use data from three rounds, Rounds 9, 10 and 11, of Russian Longitudinal Moni-
toring Survey (RLMS) for years 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. The survey collects
a vast array of data at both household and individual level on income, expenditures,
health, employment, consumption, living conditions, land and time use, qualitative
variables on the head of a household and data on wage arrears. Table 2.3 provides the
list of variables used in the analysis. The data is mostly household based but addition-
ally individual characteristics of persons identified as a head of a household are used.
Individual characteristics used in the analysis are labor market characteristics and his
or her marital status.
Only households surveyed during round 9 with complete information were included,
thus new families added to the sample during rounds 10 and 11 are not in the analysis.
Originally round 9 of RLMS included data on 4006 households but the final sample
used in the analysis consists of a panel on 2335 households for three years totaling in
6756 observations. Except the data on access to various type of household utilities and
wage arrears, variables overall do not contain missing values.
On average about 23% of households (average over rounds) in the sample indicated
that they had unpaid household bills. Interestingly, share of households, which indi-
cated that they had unpaid housing bills is almost the same both in urban and rural
settlements, though access rates to utilities certainly differ. Table 2.1 shows percent-
age of households, which reported existence of unpaid housing bills in rural and urban
areas as well as poor and non-poor households2. Years correspond to survey rounds
2Country level poverty threshold was used for identifying poor households.
21
Table 2.1: Existence of unpaid bills in the sample households
Settlement type Poverty status 2001 2002 2003
Urban
Poor 42.2 40.1 34.7
Non-poor 21.2 22.6 20.1
Rural
Poor 36.4 34.6 28.4
Non-poor 22.8 20.6 18.8
and we can see that non-payment rate has been falling among both urban and rural
households, though existence of unpaid bills still seems substantial, especially among
poor households in urban areas.
In the sample most households (65%) live in urban areas, while the rest of the house-
holds reside in rural areas and so-called city-type settlements. In the analysis city-type
settlements were classified as rural settlements. Observations are also classified based
on eight geographical regions with distinct dummy variable for major metropolian
areas, Moscow and Saint Petersburg3.
About 60% of households are indicated as male-headed, while about 11% are female-
headed just as shown in Table 2.3. As for employment status of household heads,
around 8% of family heads reported themselves as unemployed. Additionally, over
the survey period around 29% of household heads indicated that at the time of an
interview, their place of work owed him or her money, thus wage arrears incidence was
quite significant. Marital status of a household head has also been included. The latter
might be considered as an indicator of the family structure of a given household. Over
60% of household heads are indicated as married, over 7% as “living together, but not
registered”, while the rest being divorced (about 11%), widowed (over 15%)and never
married (about 10%).
3The other regions are Northern and North Western, Central and Cenral Black-Earth, Volga-
Vyatski and Volga Basin, North Caucasian, Ural, Western Siberian and Eastern Siberian and Far
Eastern.
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Table 2.2: Access to utilities in urban and rural areas (in percent)
Urban areas Rural areas Overall
Central heating 87 29 67
Central water 91 52 77
Hot water 72 17 53
Central sewerage 86 25 65
Metric gas 88 47 74
Data on poverty status of a household is also provided. Poverty status is shown by a
dummy variable, which equals one if a total household income is less than a threshold
level and zero if it is not. During the analysis we refer to a poverty threshold level
determined for the whole Russia rather than threshold levels used for a particular
region of the country. Threshold level along with corresponding dummy variable are
provided in the original data set. Based on a country level poverty threshold, we see
that on average over the survey period about 28% of households may be qualified as
“poor”, though if separate rounds are considered this percentage has declined from
36.4% in 2001 (round 9) to 21.5% in 2003 (round 11).
As for access to utilities Table 2.2 presents access rates to various utilities in our sample
overall and separately for urban and rural households. As expected, access rates to
utilities differ substantially among urban and rural households.
2.4 Econometric Specification
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a household at a time
of the survey had unpaid housing and utility bills and, thus, we use limited dependent
variable models to estimate such an equation.
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First, we have performed Hausman-type test to test for fixed individual effects, which
is based on the difference between conditional fixed-effects logistic regression formu-
lated by Chamberlain (1985) and the usual logistic estimation, where Chamberlain’s
estimator is consistent whether the null hypothesis that the fixed individual effects are
not present is true or not, while usual logistic estimation is consistent and efficient
under the null hypothesis (see (Baltagi, 2005)). Though, the test has been performed
not on the whole sample and complete set of variables due to the following reason.
A particular feature of Chamberlain’s estimator is that it uses only those groups of
data, or households in our case, for which the value of dependent variable has changed
from zero to one or vice versa. This resulted in that 1575 groups or households, which
accounted for 4511 observations have been dropped from the estimation. Total num-
ber of observations used by Chamberlain’s estimator was 2245, which is substantially
less than our initial sample. Obtained value of Hausman’s χ2 statistic equals 18.43,
which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the fixed individual effects
are not present.4 Moreover, geographical variables, which we are interested in, were
also dropped by the estimator due to no within-group variation. Thus, random-effect
models were preferable. We implement random-effects probit estimation methods to
verify the results. And it is worth mentioning that in a probit estimation results might
be dependent on the number of quadrature points. We performed quadrature check
procedure and established that increase or decrease in the number of quadrature points
in random effects probit estimation does not affect results significantly. Thus, probit
estimation has been performed with 12 quadrature points.
Additionally, we can not ignore the dependence between past non-payment history
and the probability of non-payment at present, then a dynamic model that takes into
account the household’s past experience is more appropriate. However the estimation
of dynamic binary choice panel data model is far more complicated than the static
4Results can be provided upon request.
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one. In probit or logit models, all explanatory variables should be strictly exogenous,
otherwise the parameter estimates, especially for short panels (i.e. with small temporal
dimension), jointly estimated with the individual effects can be seriously biased. Arel-
lano and Carrasco (2003) propose a GMM estimator which is shown to be consistent
and asymptotically normal for fixed T and large N. They present a class of binary
choice panel data models with the following features: The explanatory variables are
predetermined but not strictly exogenous, including lagged dependent variables; indi-
vidual effects are allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables. By means
of Monto Carlo simulation in a binary choice model with a single lagged dependent
variable, they compare the performance of the two-step GMM estimator with other
estimators, such as maximum likelihood (ML) estimator etc. and conclude that the
GMM estimator performs as well as the ML estimator, but the biases of GMM estima-
tion increase with T for fixed N and tend to be higher for data with higher persistence.
In our case, there are total 3 periods of survey, thus in a dynamic model, T = 2 and
N is substantially large. So the GMM estimator will be more efficient here.
We estimated two specifications of the dynamic models: with and without the variable
on wage arrears. The reason for estimating twice is that the wage arrears happen
only for those who were employed and thus taking it into account will drop out those
households whose heads are unemployed in the sample. Then in the specification with
wage arrears, the employment status of the household head is dropped for collinearity,
however the use of this variable reduces included observations to 2717 (from initial
4506). Nevertheless, we included this variable in a separate estimation, since wage
arrears had been a serious issue in transition countries. Though, due to reduced sample
size, results of estimation with wage arrears should be considered with additional
caution. Thus, estimation has been done with and without this variable to see if it has
effect on utility payment arrears.
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2.4.1 Explanatory variables
As mentioned above Table 2.3 provides the list of explanatory variables used in the
analysis with their corresponding mean and standard deviation. Two types of variables
have been used: those characterizing certain features of a household head and those
providing information on a household itself. We use information on employment status
of a household head, marriage status, whether a household head is a pensioner and
whether an employee of a household head owes him or her money. We also include a
dummy variable, which equals one if a family is female-headed.
As for household-level variables, we use size of a household, number of children less
than six years old and of school-age, real housing benefits in 1992 rubles, and a poverty
indicator, which equals one if a household is considered to be ‘poor’ by an income
threshold defined for the whole Russia. We also include variables indicating whether
a house or an apartment a household lives in is its private, or as it is sometimes put
“privatized”, property. Dummy variables defining access by a household to various
utilities, such as central heating, central water, hot water, central sewerage and metric
gas, are also included.
Moreover, there is one more crucial household variable directly affecting the collection
rates of utility, the affordability, which is a problem for low-income consumers in most
countries, in particular in the CIS countries. Fankhauser and Tepic (2005) find that
there is a positive relation between the affordability and the probability of payment.
Simply speaking, affordability is defined as the share of monthly household income that
is spent on utility services, such as electricity, district heating and water. In order to
assess whether it is problematic, many governments and international financial insti-
tutions have developed ad hoc rules on what constitutes an acceptable level of utility
expenditures. That is, affordability becomes problematic if the utility bills account
for more than 25 percent of total outgoings on average over a year. We calculate the
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Table 2.3: Variables used in the analysis
Variable Details Mean St.dev.
HH† non-payment(hunpaid) (1=utility unpaid) 0.23 0.42
HH head unemployed (unem-s) (1=unemployed) 0.08 0.28
HH head married (marstat2 ) (1=married) 0.60 0.49
HH head pensioner (pensio) (1=pensioner) 0.34 0.47
HH head is owed money at work (pjowed) (1=owed money currently) 0.29 0.45
Female headed (fh) (1= HH female headed) 0.11 0.31
HH size (nfmem) - 2.81 1.43
HH affordability(aff ) - 0.09 0.35
Number of children <6 years (ncat1 ) - 0.19 0.47
Number of children 6-18 years (ncat2 ) - 0.48 0.74
Savings (savingr) in 1992 rubles 359.55 2051.77
Lendings (lendr) in 1992 rubles 316.46 7080.55
Real housing benefits (aptbenr) in 1992 rubles 46.54 125.92
Poverty indicator (a-pind) (1=below threshold) 0.28 0.45
Private property (hhpp) (1=owning private) 0.72 0.45
Central heating (hcheat) (1=available) 0.67 0.47
Central water (hcwatr) (1=available) 0.77 0.42
Hot water (hhwatr) (1=available) 0.53 0.49
Central sewerage (hcsewr) (1=available) 0.65 0.48
Metric gas (hmgas) (1=available) 0.75 0.43
Settlement type (sett-typ) (1=urban) 0.65 0.47
Moscow and St. Petersburg (r1 ) - 0.04 0.20
Northern and North Western (r2 ) - 0.07 0.26
Central and Central Black-Earth (r3 ) - 0.21 0.40
Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin (r4 ) - 0.21 0.40
North Caucasian (r5 ) - 0.13 0.33
Ural (r6 ) - 0.16 0.36
Western Siberian (r7 ) - 0.06 0.25
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern (r8 ) - 0.08 0.27
Notes:†household
affordability as the proportion of utility expenditure in the total expenditure of the
household and the mean of it is 9%, which is lower than the bechmark, but they are
scattered distributed with large standard deviation. So in this sample, the affordability
may be problematic for some families and it is supposed to be negatively correlated
with the probability of payment arrears.
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As for geographical identifiers, dummy variable indicating whether a household lives
in an urban or rural area has been included. The survey provides information on
three types of settlements – urban, rural and so-called settlements of urban type. In
our analysis, we have identified the latter as rural households as well. Additionally,
regional identifiers have also been included indicating separately largest metropolitan
areas as Moscow and Saint Petersburg and seven other regions of Russia.
Additionally, we have included such expenditure categories as household savings and
lendings to control for their effect on the payment behavior.
People may ask whether those dummy variables especially those for the financial sta-
tus of the household could be highly correlated, for example, usually households hav-
ing lendings or owning private properties are much less likely to be poor. Moreover,
Guzanova (1998) who analyzes privatization patterns in Russia, finds that pensioners
are an active group of population, who privatized their housing along with well-off
households. This finding raises concerns about possible dependence problem arising
from certain variables in our analysis – dummy variable on retirement status of a
household head, poverty status and a variable specifying ownership of a housing. Thus
we also check the correlation between them, just as shown in Table 2.4. However none
of them are highly correlated with others. The largest correlation is between the mar-
riage statement of the household head and whether the household is female headed,
which is -0.37. So according to this sample, the female heads are more prone to be
unmarried or divorced.
2.4.2 Estimation Results
Table 2.5 provides estimation results. The first column provides estimates from
random-effects probit regression. The second and third columns present results of
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Table 2.4: Correlation of the variables
Variables
HH† head unemployed 1.00
HH head married .0086 1.00
HH head pensioner -.21 -.22 1.00
Female headed .018 -.37 -.17 1.00
HH affordability .074 -.0127 -.018 .01 1.00
Lendings -.011 .0186 -.0214 -.0057 .0013 1.00
Real housing benefits -.042 -.048 .14 .047 -.011 -.01 1.00
Poverty indicator .25 .073 -.29 .06 .12 -.02 -.052 1.00
Private property .034 -.017 .14 -.071 -.016 .009 -.052 -.048 1.00
Settlement type -.12 -.037 .025 .08 .051 -.014 .14 -.15 -.23 1.00
Notes: †household
dynamic models. Column three presents results for the subsample of the employed,
and thus with a variable on wage arrears, which was included once for reasons spec-
ified above, while columns one and two present results without this variable but for
the full sample. We will focus on random-effect estimation methods, since Hausman
χ2 statistic indicated that fixed effects are not present and, additionally, fixed-effects
estimator drops important geographical identifiers.
In those two AR(1) binary choice models, the first-order lagged variables are both
highly positively significant, which demonstrates that those households who have ex-
perienced non-payment in the last year are much more likely not to pay for the utility
this term. So we cannot ignore the influence of the past and the dynamic models are
more credible. However we also find that most of the coefficients are consistent across
these two types of estimations. According to the first two columns, the affordability
is highly significant and, just as expected, negative. So the smaller the proportion of
expenditure on utilities in the total outlay is, the smaller is the probability that the
household won’t pay. And unemployment of a household head is a significant deter-
minant of existence of non-payments in a household for the full sample. Interestingly,
dummy variable for pensioners appears highly significant and negative, indicating that
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Table 2.5: Estimation results
Explanatory Variables R.e.Probit GMM(Full) GMM(Empl.)
HH unpaid util. last year 0.35** 0.38**
(0.016) (0.019)
HH affordability -0.80** -0.043**
(0.26) (0.016)
HH head unemployed 0.57** 0.051*
(0.20) (0.024)
HH head pensioner -1.08** -0.046** -0.064**
(0.18) (0.012) (0.021)
Owed money at work 0.066**
(0.018)
No. children <6 years 0.18*
(0.08)
No. children 6-18 years 0.53** 0.032** 0.028**
(0.12) (0.009) (0.011)
Lendings 9.48e-07** 6.94e-07**
(2.08e-07) (2.67e-07)
Real housing benefits -0.002** -0.0002**
(0.00) (0.00)
Poverty indicator 0.43** 0.054**
(0.15) (0.016)
Private property -0.79** -0.061**
(0.15) (0.014)
Central heating 0.64* 0.045*
(0.27) (0.022)
Settlement type 0.042*
(0.021)
Northern and North Western 1.35* 0.051*
(0.53) (0.023)
Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin 1.40** 0.037*
(0.49) (0.029)
Ural 1.34** 0.054**
(0.49) (0.016)
Western Siberian 1.67** 0.056*
(0.49) (0.025)
Constant -2.47** 0.15** 0.064**
(0.55) (0.016) (0.018)
Number of Observations 4483 4506 2717
Notes: Single and double “*” indicate 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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pensioner-headed households have better payment discipline. This might seem unlikely
at first sight, since pensioners in transition countries are typically classified as in low-
income part of population. This finding suggests that retired people might be more
responsible as far as payments for services are concerned. Additionally, as the sample
shows pensioner-headed households are typically small, which may have an effect on
their payment discipline. In the sample almost 45% of pensioner-headed households
are single person, while almost 41% are two-person households.
Variables for a number of children appeared significant, especially the number of chil-
dren of 6−18 years old. This might suggest that in some families with school-age
children expenditures for products and services other than utilities are higher (like
food, clothing, school related expenses, pocket money for children and etc.), which
leads to households having problem with timely payment of utilities. This could also
be the reason why the dummy on little children, i.e. smaller than school age, is not
significant in the dynamic model.
Lendings of households could not be neglected even with the rather little value, since
lending appears significant. Housing and apartment benefits on the other hand are
highly significant in all specifications and with expected negative sign, though the value
of the coefficient is relatively low. Those small values are derived from the scaling of
those covariates, as shown in Table 2.3. Poverty indicator is highly significant with
positive sign in all specifications. This might suggest that to a big extent non-payments
for utilities in Russia among other potential reasons is a problem of poverty rather
than negligence or simple refusal to pay higher than previous fees as it is sometimes
suggested.
Dummy variable indicating whether an apartment or house is a private property is
highly significant in all specifications and has negative sign. This indicates that house-
holds living in a not privatized housing are more inclined to have payment arrears.
The issue of ownership seems to be worth analyzing further but in current setting it
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is difficult to identify how exactly this factor affects payment discipline. Interestingly,
according to Guzanova (1998), there are few incentives for many Russian households to
buy a private housing and a sense of “occupational rights” still plays a significant role
in people’s attitude towards housing in Russia. Apparently, this sense of “occupation
rights” might have effect on attitude towards utility payments as well. It is important
to mention that according to the sample, households living in a not self-owned hous-
ing have substantially higher than average access rates to all utility services with, as
the estimation shows, relative higher inclination to have payment arrears. Therefore,
these households may be one of key groups of interest to advance understanding of
non-payments.
As for regional dummy variables four out of eight regions have appeared highly signifi-
cant in the full sample estimation. All these four regions are underdeveloped compared
to other metropolitan, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. For example, Western
Siberian region, according to Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005), Siberia is a region with
one of the highest incidence of poverty. And the three insignificant regions are the
most developed areas in Russia, where just as expected, the collecting rates should be
higher than others. However, there is one exception, north Caucasian region, which
has gone through long-lasting military conflict, and thus might have contributed to
low payment discipline in this region. However in our specification, it turns out to be
insignificant.
As we clarified above, due to the potential significance of wage arrears, estimation has
been performed separately with this variable as well for the subsample of the employed.
The descriptive statistics of the employed is very similar with the full sample except
with better income and financial status, such as affordability, savings and lendings
etc.. Estimation results for this subsample are presented in the last column with some
differences from coefficients for the full sample. Not surprisingly, the new variable in-
dicating existence of wage arrears appeared highly significant with positive sign. This
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suggests that wage arrears also have an impact on existence of utility payment arrears.
As for the rest of the variables, the unpaid experience in the last year, dummies for
whether a pensioner is the household head, whether having children between 6-18 years
old and whether the household has lendings remain significant with the same sign and
close value of coefficients as in the full sample estimation. However covariates about
finance status of a household, such as the affordability, poverty indicator and whether
they own private property and all the regional dummies turn to be insignificant. On
the other hand, the access to central water and settlement type show as significant
factors. Significance of variable on settlement type has appeared with positive sign.
This might be an indicator of the fact that access rates to utilities are higher in ur-
ban settlements, thus non-payments are more frequent there. Access to central water
is positively significant here, which is consistent with Fankhauser et al. (2008), who
also find a negative correlation between the accumulation of arrears with connection
rates to centralized gas and sewerage in Ukraine. As Fankhauser et al. (2008) explain
the relationship between access to utilities and payment arrears, the positive relation-
ship may be explained by difficulties in disconnecting households for non-payments.
Variables for access to other public utilities, on the contrary, are insignificant.
Despite the fact that significance has not changed between estimates of static and
dynamic models, value of coefficients differ with coefficients obtained from static es-
timation being approximately ten times as large as those from a dynamic model. In
the specifications with wage arrears variable, variable on unemployment was omitted,
since data on wage arrears is provided only to employed household heads. As far as
signs and significance levels of variables are concerned, results appear uniform. Never-
theless, it would be interesting to look at estimation results not only for three rounds
as in this study but for longer time periods as well.
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2.5 Conclusions
Using panel data set on thousands of households for three consecutive years we ana-
lyzed existence of utility payment arrears in Russia. Results show that incidence of
payment arrears is highly influenced by the past record of the non-payment and afford-
ability of the utility of the households and also the employment and retirement status
of the head, existence of wage arrears, number of children in a family and housing ben-
efits. Additionally, households living in non-privatized housing appear to have higher
probability of carrying payment arrears. Regionally, households in Northern and North
Western, Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin, Ural and Western Siberian regions appear
to be more inclined to have arrears.
Overall, non-payment for utility services largely appears to be a problem of poverty.
Nevertheless, one potential group for further analysis are households, who have not
yet owned private housing and appear to be more inclined not to pay utility bills on
time. This effect is highly significant and might be important for understanding the
problem better considering the fact that these households have higher than average
access rates to all types of utilities considered in this study.
Interestingly, considering the subsample of the employed only, the factors affecting the
probability of non-payment change slightly. Especially the covariates about poverty
are no longer significant, instead the dummy for wage arrears appears to be a good ex-
planatory variable. Additionally, regional dummies do not provide further explanation
of utility arrears in this subsample.
Due to limited access to the data, only three rounds of the survey have been included
in the analysis. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out if obtained results persist
in longer time periods.
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Chapter 3
Is the labor market in China
segmented? Evidence from
semi-parametric analysis
3.1 Introduction
The International Labor Organization reported (see ILO (2002)) that informal employ-
ment makes up 48% of non-agricultural employment in North Africa, 51% in Latin
America, 65% in Asia, and 72% in sub-Saharan Africa. If agricultural employment
is included, the percentage rises, moreover in some countries like India and many
sub-Saharan African countries it exceeds 90%. Estimates for developed countries are
around 15%. The dualism of labor markets especially in least developed countries
(LDC) has been discovered and debated for long. According to the dualistic view,
there are barriers to entry into formal sectors so that some workers are forced to ac-
cept informal jobs which are usually characterized by inferior earnings and working
conditions. Many existing studies of labor market segmentation underline different
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wage function specifications across formal and informal sectors and find that there are
always wage premiums in the formal sector within developing countries, such as Mex-
ico (see Magnac (1991); Gong and van Soest (2002); Roberts (1989) for Guadalajara),
Malaysia (see Mazumdar (1981)) and Turkey (see Tansel (1999)).
Along with economic restructuring and urban economic reform, China has witnessed
a surging unemployment at the end of last century: between 1995 and 2001, about
45% of all employees in the state-owned enterprises, totally 45 million, lost their jobs,
which is so called ”Xiagang”. Informal employment in China’s urban residents was
formed in this process and the Chinese government also showed an increasing interest
in expanding other forms of ownership of enterprises to address the great issue of
unemployment. Along with the economic reform, the informal economy is growing as
a more and more important growing engine of economic development. Additionally
besides the mass redundancy by government and collective owned enterprises, heavy
migration from rural areas also increases sharply the supply of informal employment.
According to the definition and estimates of informal employment by Wu and Cai
(2006), in 2002 urban informal employment reached between 40.3% and 45.2% in the
total employment. By 2008, this proportion remained at 41.0%. The average growth
rate of informal employment between 1994 and 2004 was about 12.5% annually (see
Hu and Zhao (2006)).
Does such a large-scale informal employment mean that the labor market in China
is seriously distorted along the formal-informal line? Does informal employment in
the industrialized environment with low wages indicate that they are blocked in the
inferior market and can not move? Either by the labor market segmentation theory
or finding different wage functions across sectors, Li (2009), Xu (2008) and Jin (2006)
claim that the labor market is segmented along formal and informal line. However,
Heckman and Hotz (1986) pointed out that earning functions could be different for
a variety of reasons, so people should not simply conclude that the labor market is
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segmented because factors affecting the earnings are different. Hu and Yao (2011) set
up a logit model using Chinese urban labor market data in 2001 and find that wages
increase when people enter the informal sector from the formal one, then they claim
that people are not forced to accept informal jobs. A similar study on Mexican data by
Maloney (1999) also concludes that both earnings differentials and patterns of mobility
indicate that much of the informal sector is not inferior but a desirable destination and
that the distinct modalities of work are relatively well integrated. Chen and Hamori
(2009), based on the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) questionnaire (2004
and 2006 pooling data), estimate the hourly wage equations for the formal and informal
employment separately and decompose the wage differentials by the method of Blinder
and Oaxaca. The results indicate that differences in the characteristics between formal
and informal employment account for a much higher percentage of the hourly income
differential than do discrimination for the job type.
From a methodological standpoint, in observational studies an important problem of
causal inference is how to estimate treatment effects, as like in an experiment a group
of units is exposed to a well-defined treatment, but unlike an experiment there are no
systematic methods of experimental design to maintain a control group, just as stated
by Dehejia and Wahba (2002). So the estimate of a causal effect obtained by comparing
a treatment group with a nonexperimental comparison group could be biased because
of problems such as self-selection or some systematic judgment by the researcher in
selecting units to be assigned to the treatment. Propensity score matching (PSM),
initiated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is an important subset of matching meth-
ods. It corrects for sample selection bias due to observable differences between the
treatment and comparison groups, i.e. the observable differences of the worker and job
characteristics across sectors. The basic idea of propensity score matching is to find in
the group of nonparticipants those who are similar to the participants in all relevant
pretreatment characteristics. It matches participants with certain nonparticipants who
get similar propensity scores. The propensity score employs a predicted probability of
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group membership and summarizes all the background information about treatment
selection into a scalar. Therefore, the propensity score matching controls for the differ-
ences of individuals and makes the groups receiving treatment and non-treatment more
comparable. Lechner (2000) investigates the question whether it really matters for mi-
croeconometric evaluation studies to take account of the fact that the programmes
under consideration are heterogeneous and applies propensity score matching to the
analysis of the active labor market policy in a Swiss region. Ham et al. (2005) use
propensity score matching to measure the effect of migration on the wages of those
who move. Brand and Halaby (2006) adopt this matching method to identify and
estimate the average treatment effect of attending an elite college on educational and
career achievement. Pratap and Quintin (2006) find that after controlling for selection
by propensity score matching, no wage premium remains in the formal sector for Ar-
gentinean data. Badaoui et al. (2008) provide three estimators of the informal wage
penalty in South Africa by ordinary least squares, differences-in-differences(DID) esti-
mator and combined propensity score matching and DID estimator. They find that the
informal wage penalty is only marginally higher than for the simple DID estimator but
much lower than for the OLS estimator and by taking the tax avoidance into account,
the penalty becomes insignificant.
This paper, using the data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), inves-
tigates whether the unregulated or informal labor market in China is integrated into
the formal one. It is organized as follows: Section 2 first defines informality in this
study and then describes the data; Section 3 discusses the propensity score matching
methods combined with the difference in difference estimator and the robustness to its
assumption and model specification and finally; Section 4 concludes.
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3.2 Data
The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) was designed to see how the social
and economic transformation of Chinese society is affecting the health and nutritional
status of its population. The study population is drawn from 9 provinces including
Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shan-
dong. This sample is diverse, with variation found in a wide-ranging set of socioe-
conomic factors including income, employment, education and other related health,
nutritional and demographic measures. It is pooling data for the 2004, 2006 and 2009
waves in this paper.
Due to data availability, formal employment in this paper is identified according to
the type of contract, i.e. only employees with long-term contracts are considered as
formally employed, which is in accordance with the specification by Chen and Hamori
(2009). Individuals who “work for another person or enterprise as long-term em-
ployees” are considered as the formally employed and those who are “self-employed”
or “contract workers with other people or enterprise” or “temporary workers” or “paid
family workers” are considered to be informally employed. There are in all 2056 indi-
viduals identified as informal employed accounting for 46.9% of the total sample which
is about 10 percentage points more than the population informal proportion reported
in China Statistical Book (2005)1. The reasons may be that the agricultural population
is excluded from our informal employment and the excess part of informal employment
might be derived from our specification of informal employment employed here. We
can not ignore that even some short-term employees or self-employed are entitled to
the social protections and should be categorized as formal employment. Henley et al.
(2006) also look into the degree of congruence between different practical proxies of
informality using Brazilian household survey data for the period 1992 to 2001. They
1Definition of informal employment in this paper is not completely consistent with the one in the
official annual statistical book.
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find that in the self-employed group, there are roughly 99% individuals not having
labor cards, and in the temporary employees, the percentage is about 90 %, which
means that 10% of the temporary employees are incorrectly identified as informal
workers according to our proxy of informal employment. Although the exact amount
of misspecification depends on countries, their results indicate that our categorization
of formal and informal employment overestimate the amount of informal employment
in China.
ILO (2002) characterizes informal employment as follows: Under the expanded con-
cept, informal employment is understood to include all remunerative work - both self-
employment and wage employment - that is not recognized, regulated, or protected by
existing legal or regulatory frameworks as well as non-remunerative work undertaken
in an income-producing enterprise. As China has experienced the economic transition
from a totally planned economy, all the employment was permanent before the eco-
nomic reform. According to this specific conditions, Hu and Yang (2001) give their
definition of the Chinese informal employment as: The informal sector in China mainly
refers to small-scale business units outside of the legally established independent cor-
porate units (enterprises, institutions, government agencies, community groups and
social organizations). Informal employment in China mainly refers to the employment
existing in the informal sector and sometimes those in the formal sector, including
temporary employment, part-time employment, dispatching labor force, subcontract-
ing workers etc. They also set up an empirical proxy of the definition of Chinese urban
informal employment as the self-employed or family or temporary workers and claim
that the large amount of rural migrants workers cannot be easily precisely counted up,
so that they are not included in the informal employment.
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper are stated in Table 3.1. Peo-
ple are surveyed for the income of last month, including wages, bonuses and subsidies
(grocery subsidy, health allowance, bath and haircut allowance, book and newspaper
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Table 3.1: Individual and job characteristics of formal and informal employment
All Formal Informal Diff “Contract
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD t-test workers”
Hourly wage 5.28 8.83 5.22 9.21 5.35 8.23 -.08* 5.42
Age 37.55 13.55 38.23 12.06 36.44 14.61 1.79* 32.13
Experience 26.04 13.87 26.44 12.19 25.37 16.23 1.07* 20.77
Married .64 .48 .72 .45 .54 .50 .12* .57
East .34 .47 .34 .47 .34 .47 .003* .38
Hukou .74 .44 .77 .42 .69 .46 .08 .66
Gender .51 .50 .56 .49 .42 .49 .26* .40
Health Cond. .96 .23 .97 .18 .95 .18 .003* .97
Education
University .11 .29 .14 .33 .08 .22 .12* .13
Vocational .19 .33 .28 .37 .07 .26 .11* .07
High school .29 .40 .27 .41 .37 .38 .09 .18
Middle school .31 .45 .22 .44 .37 .46 -.05* .31
Primary school .10 .30 .09 .28 .11 .31 -.02 .08
Establishment size
< 20 .17 .29 .09 .27 .39 .32 -.02* .15
20− 100 .32 .32 .21 .41 .38 .29 .12* .26
> 100 .51 .45 .69 .48 .23 .38 .29* .59
Type of work unit
government .52 .49 .70 .30 .30 .34 .70* .45
collective .18 .28 .06 .21 .37 .35 -.07* .17
private .29 .31 .25 .21 .34 .39 -.06* .38
Type of occupation
Technological .24 .38 .42 .40 .07 .33 .07 .14
Management .12 .27 .23 .30 .10 .21 .06* .06
Craft .55 .48 .38 .49 .74 .47 .07 .44
Service .10 .25 .07 .25 .19 .25 .01* .12
2004 .256 .276 .234
2006 .296 .324 .264
2009 .448 .400 .502
Observations 4385 2329 2056 372
Notes: Age is measured in years and real hourly wage in RMB yuan. Other entries give the friction of
employees in each category.
allowance, housing and other subsidies) and also the working hours. The hourly wage
engaged in our analysis is calculated as income standardized by the total work hours
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in that month. The informal employees can earn slightly more than the formal in
our data. One reason might be that the self-employed are included in the informal
employment which will enhance the average income of informal employment.
The sample average age is around 37 years, while formal employees are in general older
than the informal employees and 72% formal employees are married, compared to 54%
informal workers. Education levels here are categorized based on academic degrees
with five dummy variables for “professional school (3-year college) or higher”, “tech-
nical or vocational degree”, “upper middle school degree”, “lower middle school degree
” and “primary school”. Most of the individuals are not highly educated, especially
in the informal sector, as their average age is about 40 years, for whom the nine-year
compulsory education was not implemented in China. Experience is then calculated as
age diminished by years of schooling, which are 15 for those with professional school
(3-year college) or higher, 14 for technical or vocational degree, 12 for upper middle
school degree, 9 for lower middle school degree and 6 for primary school. The formal
employees are slightly more experienced than the informal. East represents whether
people are settled in the eastern area, i.e. in Shandong or Jiangsu province, where
economies are more developed. There are in total 34% of those surveyed settled in
the east and the formal employees concentrate more in the eastern provinces than the
informal. Hukou denotes whether the employee is registered as rural or urban resident.
This also matters a lot in China, as in the countryside, people do not have access to
some social securities, such as free education for the children and health insurance.
Formal employment also outperforms informal one in this measure, although overall
there are about 74% people from the rural areas. It is interesting to notice that more
than half of the surveyed people work in large firms, i.e. firms with more than 100
employees. Moreover, about 70 % formal employees are in large enterperises in this
survey. This might be caused by the methods of categorization, as in China we can
hardly call a firm with 100 employees large. According to the conventional classifi-
cation of firm scales in CSB (2010), enterprises with more than 2000 employees can
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be considered as large and those with 300 workers or less are classified as small firms.
According to the type of work unit and occupation, there are more informal workers
in state owned (government owned or collective owned) enterprises and more techno-
logical and managing employees, while informal workers concentrate doing craft and
service work and in private sectors.
The second last column in the Table 3.1 is the results of the test for the mean difference
between the formal and informal groups. Most of the differences are significantly
different from zero, which means the formal and informal employees are very distinct
with each other according to the human and job characteristics. It is very interesting to
find that the informal employees tend to work in smaller establishments and do manual
labor as craftsmen or service workers and they are in general younger, less educated
than the formal employees, but can earn more than the others. This can be explained
as the following: paying personal income tax and the social insurance is compulsory for
the formal employees, which reduces the income level of them. Moreover, the formal
employees, especially those work in the large or state-owned enterprise can obtain
much in-kind and other hidden income.
The classification of informal employment in this paper is consistent with that in Hu
and Yang (2001), except for the “contract workers with other people or enterprise”.
Contract workers, which are defined as short-term employees recruited by enterprises
or institutions by signing an employment contract,2 are different from either long-term
or temporary workers, as they have to buy the social insurance by themselves but
sometimes they can also get some allowance either from the company or the govern-
ment. In this context, they should be classified as informal employment. And it would
be interesting to look into details of the contract workers, the descriptive statistics of
which are shown in the last column of Table 3.1. There are in all 372 out of 4385
surveyed people signed as contract workers, and they are earning slightly more than
2See www.baike.baidu.com/view/136312.htm#1 for the definition of Chinese contract workers.
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the average informal employees, and younger and higher educated, but in general, they
are not the outliers among the informal employees.
To keep in accordance with other studies for segmentation of labor market by informal-
ity, agricultural households are excluded in our analysis. According to Chinese labor
law, we only keep employees between 16 (school leaving age) and 59 (state retirement
age) years old.
3.3 Combined Diff-in-diff Propensity Score Match-
ing Estimator
Matching, as a strategy to control for covariates, has attracted increasing empirical
interests in the past decade or two. One common feature of the structural regres-
sion estimators is to assume the linearity of the relationship to underlie the effects
of treatment, which can lead to comparing very different treated- and control-group
individuals. Thus one would ideally like to estimate the treatment effects of individu-
als with similar characteristics, in our case, to compare the wage differences for each
groups of similar employees, in which there are some working in the formal sector
while others are in the informal sector. One difficulty in ensuring that one can have
such comparable groups is the reduction of the comparison dimensionality, as usually
there is a set of characteristics that determine the selection into the formal sector and
the wages, hence people face the problem of matching individuals on multiple dimen-
sions. The section in the follows will present one possible solution to this problem by
combining the differences-in-differences and propensity score matching estimator.
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3.3.1 Propensity Score (PS) Matching
The propensity score, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is defined as the
conditional probability of being treated, i.e.
p(x) = Pr(z = 1|x),
where x is the observed covariates and z is the treatment assignment with 1 for being
treated and 0 for without treatment. It is shown by them as the coarsest balancing
score, b(x), which is defined as a function of x, such that the conditional distribution
of x given b(x) is the same for treated (z = 1) and controlled (z = 0), meaning that
given the covariates, propensity score matching can be used to balance the covariates
in the two groups, and therefore reduce the selection bias.
In econometric literatures, the value of interest, and most commonly studied amount
i.e. the Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT), is then defined by Heckman
et al. (1999) as:
αT = E(r|x, z = 1)− E(r|x, z = 0),
where r is the outcome. However, the latter item is counter-factual, as for any treated
individual, people cannot observe their outcomes for being untreated. In order to
be able to calculate the latter item, a key assumption is required for identification,
which was first articulated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as “ignorable treatment
assignment”, or the “conditional independence assumption (CIA)” by Lechner (2000)
(r1, ro) ⊥⊥ z|x,
which requires that the treatment assignment z should be conditionally independent
of the response (r1, ro) given x. Lechner (2002) calls this assumption a “data hungry”
identification strategy and points out that all that is needed is to identify mean effects
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is conditional mean independence. So he claims in most empirical studies it would
be difficult to argue why conditional mean independence should hold and CIA might
nevertheless be violated. However in the following empirical study of training effect
on the wage levels, he just assumes the data base is fairly informative because it
contains all the information, thus the independence assumption should be fulfilled.
Brand and Halaby (2006) make a similar assumption that their observable exogenous
covariates capture pre-treatment characteristics of units that determine selection into
treatment and control status, into elite and non-elite colleges. They also indicate that
all frameworks for causal inference make a similar assumption at some point.
There has been some controversy about the plausibility of the CIA in economic setting,
arguing that agents’ optimizing behavior precludes their choices being independent of
the potential outcomes, whether or not conditional on covariates. However, Imbens
(2004) provides three arguments against those queries. First, statistically the logical
step of evaluation of any program is to adjust any difference in average outcomes
for differences in exogenous background characteristics, so that the violation of such
an assumption would seem difficult to rationalize in a serious attempt to understand
the evidence regarding the effect of the treatment; secondly, that assumption merely
asserts that all variables that need to be adjusted for are observed by the researcher,
which is an empirical question and not one that should be controversial as a general
principle; finally, even without invalidating that assumption, two agents with the same
values for observed characteristics may differ in their treatment choices, as sometime
the difference in their choices is driven by differences in unobserved characteristics that
are unrelated to the outcomes of interest. In general, the validity of the conditional
independence assumption is an empirical question, depending on the exact nature of
the optimization process faced by the agents.
There is one way to release the strong conditional independence assumption, when
people are only interested in the ATT. As there, only the independence of the controls
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is needed. In this case, we only need to assume that
ro ⊥⊥ z|x.
In this paper, denote the wage in formal and informal sector as ωF and ω I respectively,
the treatment z = 1 for formal employment and z = 0 for informal one and X and Y
as the characteristics of individual and employer. The CIA is then as follows
(ωF,ω I) ⊥⊥ z|(X,Y). (3.1)
It is a strong assumption assuming that our data is so informative that the choice of
be formally or informally employed only depends on the observable characteristics of
the employees and firms, but not the formal and informal wages they might obtain.
It also indicates that in this model, the offer for the job type is predetermined by the
characteristics, so that bargaining is almost impossible. Imagine that before posting
a job offer, the firm has already decided to hire a certain person either formally or
informally. This may be restricted by the social regulation or their budget. Then the
candidates are already aware of the type of job before they bargain for the possible
wage.
The average effect of the treated, i.e. the wage premium of the formal employment in
our study, is then defined as
αT = E(ωF|X,Y, z = 1)− E(ω I |X,Y, z = 1).
With the fulfillment of the CIA assumption, the formal wage premium becomes
αT = E(ωF|X,Y, z = 1)− E(ω I |X,Y, z = 0).
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Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also establish that conditioning on the propensity score
is equivalent to conditioning on the covariates themselves, which means that
αT = E(ωF|P(X,Y), z = 1)− E(ω I |P(X,Y), z = 0).
In our case, to estimate the after-matching wage premium αM, write i ∈ F if worker i is
formally employed, and j ∈ I if worker j is informally employed. pi = Pr(z = 1|Xi,Yi)
and pj = Pr(z = 0|Xj,Yj) denote their propensity scores. Then we can compute αM
as
αMT =
1
N ∑i∈F
(
ωFi −∑
j∈I
φ(|pi − pj|)ω Ij
)
,
where N is the number of informal employees in the sample and the function
φ(
∣∣pi − pj∣∣) ∈ [0, 1] accounts for the weight assigned to informal worker j matched
for the formal worker i and it should be a decreasing function of the difference of pi
and pj.
3.3.2 Differences-in-Differences(DID) PSM Matching Esti-
mator
The assumption in Equation (3.1) might be violated is one concern of propensity
matching estimation. This occurs when the selection into the formal sector may rely
on the unobserved heterogeneity which affects the wages. A differences-in-differences
matching strategy, as defined by Heckman et al. (1997), allows for temporally invariant
differences between the treated and control groups, thus is less demanding of the data.
However, it is also more demanding because it requires pre-programme data. Heckman
et al. (1997) verify the validity of those two assumptions. The CIA assumption similar
with our Equation (3.1) are decisively rejected in the data, while the weaker assumption
that justifies the conditional DID method is not rejected for any group. Similarly,
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Smith and Todd (2005) show that the CIA assumption in Equation (3.1) does not hold
using a case study, instead, they combined a PSM estimator with a DID estimator and
find that it performs the best in a nonexperimental context. Thus in this section we
proceed along this line.
Let t represent a time period after the programme start date and t′ a time period before
the programme. The combined DID estimator compares the conditional before-after
earnings of programme participants with those of non-participants. In the context of
our study, this estimator compares the change in wage for workers who move from the
informal to the formal sector to the wage change of workers who remain in the informal
sector from one period to the next. So the effect of the treatment on the treated, in
this context, the wage premium of the movers compared to the stayers turns to
αMDID =
1
N ∑i∈I→F
(
(ωFit −ω Iit′)− ∑
j∈I→I
φ(|pi − pj|)(ω Ijt −ω Ijt′)
)
,
where i ∈ I → F denotes the individual who moves from being informally employed
to formally and j ∈ I → I denotes those who stay in the informal status.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
We begin with estimating the propensity scores by a probit specification. As suggested
by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we start with a parsimonious model with most of the co-
variates, and in order to go through the balancing test, i.e. for all covariates, differences
in means across treated and comparison units within each stratum are not significantly
different from zero, the model is modified by adding some interaction terms. Results in
Table 3.2 show that the significant independent variables are gender, hukou dummies
for education levels, establish sizes, types of work unit, living in eastern provinces and
the indicators which takes the value 1 if people are doing technological work. Addition-
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ally, the interaction terms of dummies for working in the government-owned enterprise
and large firms, registered as urban residence and living in eastern provinces, working
in government owned and living in the east are significant. By caculating the marginal
effects of the covariates, we can observe that the propensity score increases if people
are male, relatively highly educated, if people work in the large enterprises and en-
gaged in a technological job. Working in private and government-owned firms are both
positively significant, so working in the collective group has a negative impact relative
to other firms. However it is surprising to notice that registered as urban has a nega-
tive effect on the probability of being formally employed. It can be explained as that
working formally will help the rural people obtain permanent city resident certificate,
which is supposed to bring them many advantages. So the rural residence are much
more prone to seize the opportunity to be employed formally. Among the interaction
terms, if people work in a large and government-owned enterprise, the probability of
being formally will rise a lot and similarly for the eastern urban residence. However
working in the eastern government-owned firms will reduce this probability. The result
of the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test indicates that we cannot reject the good
fit of the model. Thus we can say that our data is acceptably informative.
Figure 3.1 describes the histogram of estimated propensity scores for the two types of
job. It is obvious that the critical condition of common support, which is imposed to
ensure that propensity scores used from the control group fit within the minimum and
maximum propensity scores from the treatment groups, is satisfied.
As we employ the propensity score matching method to account for the differences of
characteristics between the two groups, it is necessary to check whether the character-
istics distribute similarly. Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of each covariates for the
treated and the control groups in the common support, where the distributions are
very similar for each group and there are always very large overlaps. So the propensity
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Table 3.2: Results of Probit estimation of propensity scores
Coefficient Marginal Eff. p-value
Experience -.002 .00 0.63
Gender .14* .04 0.03
Married .13 .04 0.13
East .20* .06 0.19
Hukou -.32* -.11 0.03
Education
university .38* .11 0.00
vocational degree .40* .11 0.00
high school .31* .09 0.00
middle school -.01 -.003 0.87
Establishment size
< 20 .04 .04 0.00
> 100 .94* .23 0.00
Type of work unit
government 3.03* .87 0.00
private .44* .12 0.00
Type of occupation
Technological .46* .09 0.00
Management -.03 -.01 0.76
Service -.12 -.03 0.31
Interaction Terms
I(gov.large) 1.3* .46 0.00
I(hukou.east) .27* .003 0.00
I(hukou.exp) .01 .00 0.06
I(small.private) -.37 -.12 0.08
I(gov.east) -.67* -.28 0.00
Constant -1.58* 0.00
Common Support 4086 93.18%
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test 0.56
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the individual works formally. Asterisks
denote significance at 5% level of t-test.
score is a good proxy of the characteristics, i.e. conditioning on similar propensity
score is equivalent to conditioning on similar characteristics of employees and firms.
However in principle, the probability observing two units with exactly the same propen-
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sity score is zero since the propensity score is a continuous variable. In order to identify
the informal workers (control) who are acceptably matched to any given formal worker
(treated), there are several matching algorithms after knowing the propensity scores.
The most widely used are Nearest Neighbor Matching, Caliper Matching and Kernel
Matching. Nearest neighbor matching reports for each treated unit a control unit
with the closest propensity score and is usually used with replacement, that is certain
control unit can be matched for several treated units. Then the difference between
the outcome of the treated units and the outcome of the matched control units is
computed. The ATT of interest is then obtained by averaging these differences. How-
ever there is pitfall of this matching method, as the closest matched control units can
have a very different propensity score with the given treated. The caliper matching
and kernel matching can properly address this problem. With caliper matching, each
treated unit is matched only with the control units whose propensity score falls into a
predefined neighborhood of the propensity score of the treated unit. A tolerance level
is used on maximum propensity score distance to avoid risk of bad matches, and the
smaller the caliper, the better the quality of the matches. On the other hand, there
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Estimated Propensity Scores
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may be some treated not matched for very small caliper. Kernel matching uses the
weighted averages of all control units for each treated. The weights are computed as
inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treated and
controls. Three kernel functions are widely used in applied work: Gaussian, Triangu-
lar and Epanechnikov. Obviously there is a tradeoff between quality and quantity of
matches among those three matching algorithms, and none of them is superior to the
others. So people usually report the results by all three methods.
There is a not so large but acceptable amount of mobility in the informal employ-
ment sector in our data: 87 workers moved from informal employment to formal and
219 workers stayed. Table 3.3 reports the estimated average treatment effect for the
treated, in our case, the wage premium for the movers. We choose a caliper of 10−3
for caliper matching and we also tried 10−4, finding that there is little effect on the
results. Kernel matching with Epanechnikov kernel function is stated in the table and
the other two kernel functions mentioned above are also employed, while the results
are similar. The wage premium of the movers, αMDID is not significant. This suggests
that workers who move to the formal sector do not see a change, especially an increase,
in their wage than those who stay as informal employees. The result is also consistent
with the study of China’s labor market by Hu and Yao (2011). They, by introducing
the lagged variables in the regression of wages, find that there is no significant wage
decrease after the transition from informal to formal employment happens. Pratap
and Quintin (2006)) at first only use the PSM method to estimate the wage premium
of formal employment and then combine the PSM with DID estimator. The estimated
formal premium prove either small and insignificant, or negative for their Argentine
data.
However one concern of the insignificance is the possibility of decreasing the size of
sample substantially. Just as pointed out by Smith and Todd (2005), results from
a “matched” sample cannot necessarily be interpreted as representative of the whole
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Table 3.3: Wage premium αM estimated by DID PSM matching
Matching algorithms αMDID St. Err.
Caliper (γ = 10−3) .809 .765
Nearest neighbor .430 .679
Epanechnikov kernel 1.06 .699
Notes: The number of neighbors we specify here
is 2. We also tried other kernel functions, such as
Gaussian, and the results are very similar. None of
the estimates are significant at the 5% significance
level of t test.
sample.
3.3.4 Robustness Checks
The CIA assumption for our semi-parametric methods is very strong and thus the
results might be under much suspicion. So in this section, we first flank the results we
got from the DID PSM estimator by conducting other two conventional estimators:
linear regression estimated by OLS and the panel data model with fixed effect. If we
can obtain similar results from these estimators, then the matching method is more
likely to be credible. Furthermore, we also evaluate the sensitivity of our estimator of
the wage premium against various econometric specifications.
Linear Regression
We start by supposing the relationship between the wages and all the observed covari-
ates is linear. In this section, a saturated model with interaction terms of the wage
equation is implemented
ωi = αi + β1Zi + β2Xi + β3Yi + β4 Ii + ui,
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where i represents the individual units; ωi is the hourly wage; Zi is the dummy variable
taking a value of 1 if the individual is formally employed and 0 for informal employment;
Xi and Yi are the observed characteristics of the employees and jobs respectively and
Ii denotes the interaction terms, which are the product of those dummies in Xi, Yi and
Zi. The coefficient β1 can be explained as the main effects of the type of jobs on the
wages, which is of our greatest interest.
Table 3.4 presents the results estimated by OLS, which is the best linear unbiased
estimation for a linear regression. The first three columns are the results for the whole
sample, while the last two are those of the subsamples for the single and married.
Model I controls for all observed covariates of the employees and jobs. The coefficient
of the job type is insignificant there, but age, gender, whether the individual is settled
in eastern provinces and registered as urban resident and works in small company
are positively significant, and the years of experience and doing job of management
are negatively significant. Model II additionally controls for interaction terms, which
are the products of the dummies. The coeffient of a interaction term tells us how
the main effects of one covariate differs by the other covariate. For example, the
coefficient of the interaction term of job type and Hukou indicates how the formal-
informal job effect differs by the type of the individual’s residence, rural or urban.
The results show that in this specification the main effect of formal-informal job is
negatively significant, that is to say, there is wage premium of the informal employees,
which is quantitatively about 50%. This result is a little out of line with studies of
other countries. For example, Pratap and Quintin (2006) run OLS to estimate the
wage differential between formal and informal jobs in Argentina and after controlling
for individual and firm characteristics, the formal wage premium is 25 %. Badaoui
et al. (2008) find that by controlling for human and job characteristics there is still
a 37 % informal job wage penalty in South Africa. However, in China, similarly Xin
(2001) finds the informal employees can earn 33.2 % more than the formal in big
cities. Among the interaction terms, most of which are the products of the job type
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and the characteristics, there will be positively significant formal job effect on wage if
the individual is highly educated and married and negative effect if he works in large
enterprise or doing management work. Additionally, if people work in a large and
government-owned enterprise, there will be a positive effect on their income.
I have tried many different specifications of the model, especially with different inter-
action terms. It is very interesting to find that when the interaction between the job
type and marital status is not controlled for, the main effect of formal-informal job
turns to be insignificant, just as the result of the Model III for example. So I look into
more details to the subsamples according to the marital status and see what happens
to the job type effect on the wage, the results of which are shown in the last two
columns. For the married group, the job type effect is still insignificant, while for the
single, informal employees can earn significantly more than the informal. Additionally,
we can observe a quite different wage equation between the two groups. So marital
status is an essential consideration when people investigate the wage determinations
for Chinese. Mindful of this result, we can conclude that the formal-informal job effect
on the wage is sensitive to the model specification.
However one cannot ignore the assumption that we made before we run the OLS re-
gression, especially the independence assumption of the error terms with the dependent
variables conditional on all the regressors, i.e. in our case
Zi ⊥⊥ ui|X.
It requires that all the covariates explaining the wages could be observed. The R2 of a
model can tell us how much of the dependent variable can be explained by the model
and in those models above, the R2s are generally about 50%, which indicates that our
data is acceptably informative in determining the wages.
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Table 3.4: Linear Regression of Logarithm Hourly Wage Equations
Model I Model II Model III Single Married
job .08 -.49* .04 .56* .07
Experience -.02 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01
Gender .24* .07 .02 .28 .09
East .34* .37* .37* .41* .35*
Hukou .25* .12 .10 .75* -.01
Married -.03 -.45* -.04
Health Cond. .08 .12 .11 -.29 .15
Education
university .72* .45* .46* .11 .69*
vocational degree .69* .44* .46* -.33 .61*
high school .51* .54* .53* .02 .68*
middle school .06 .11* .09 -.15 .19*
Type of work unit
government -.12* -.35* -.35* -.57 -.31*
private .23* .25* .25* .32* .26*
Establishment size
< 20 .02 -.01 .01 .01 -.05
> 100 .38* .22* .17* .11 .26*
Type of occupation
Technological .05 .05 .04 -.49* .13*
Management -.36* -.28* -.29* .44* -.33*
Service .04 .05 .05 .58* .01
Interaction Terms
I(job.gender) -.05 -.04 -.38 -.04
I(job.East) .01 .01 -.25 .05
I(job.Hukou) .18 .23* -.31 .23*
I(job.HE) .36* .33* .36 .35*
I(job.Married) .65*
I(job.Management) -.09 -.08 -1.26* .05
I(job.government) .06 .05 -.11 .06
I(job.large) -.23* -.21 -.21 -.32*
I(gov.large) .45* .47* .80* .44*
I(female.exp) -.01 -.01 .00 -.01
2004 .11 -.06 .01 .02 .00
2006 -.02 -.07 .13 -.05 .17
Constant .34* .83* .57* 1.08* .23
R2 41.52% 43.58% 42.75% 53.57% 48.97%
N of Observations 4385 1578 2807
Notes: ”HE” is the dummy for the highly-educated, which is calculated as the sum of
”University”’ and ”Vocational Degree”. Dependent variable is the logarithm hourly wages.
Asterisks mean significance at 5% level of t tests.57
Fixed-Effect Panel Data Model
Although our data is acceptably rich in employee- and job-level characteristics, there
may still be some other unobserved factors both influential to the wages and the selec-
tion into formal or informal sector. One example could be the individual productivity
uncorrelated to the education and the non-pecuniary benefit of a job. The failure to
account for such characteristics could lead to biased estimation of the job type effect
on the wage. As our data is longitudinal with three surveyed waves, we can also run a
panel data model. Fixed effect models can wipe out the unobserved individual-specific
effects if they are time invariant. Another possibility would be to use an instrumen-
tal variables approach, however just as argued by Badaoui et al. (2008), it is notably
difficult to find instruments that determine selection into sectors but are convincingly
independent of the wage. The two-way fixed effect model implemented in this paper
is as follows
ωit = αi + λt + β1Zit + β2Xit + β3Yit + β4 Iit + uit,
where i and t are the individual and time indexes, αi and λt are the individual and
time-specific effects respectively and other parameters are kept consistent with the
one-dimensional linear regression. Treating the individual effects as parameters to be
estimated is algebraically the same as estimation in deviations from means. That is to
say, we need first calculate the individual means
ω¯i = αi + λ¯ + β1Z¯i + β2X¯i + β3Y¯i + β4 I¯i + u¯i.
Then the deviations from means are estimated
ωit− ω¯i = λt− λ¯+ β1(Zit− Z¯i) + β2(Xit− X¯i) + β3(Yit− Y¯i) + β4(Iit− I¯i) + uit− u¯i.
So the time invariant individual characteristics, no matter observed or unobserved, are
purged by the deviations. The results are provided in Table 3.5, where the formal-
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informal job effect is not significant. Additionally, people with more experience and
doing technological work in government-owned enterprises can expect higher income
and in contrast, working in small and private firms has a negatively significant on
the level of income. Surprisingly, we also observe a negative effect of working in
government-owned companies. This can be explained as, we actually investigate the
wage difference among the job movers,either from formal to informal or the other
way round, and in China the pecuniary income in the government agencies is not
competitive, in return the workers there can obtain much more in-kind or gray income.
As the fixed effect panel data model also controls for the unobserved effects, the esti-
mates of those coefficients should be smaller than those in the cross section equations
as we did in the last section, especially when the time-invariant unobservables are an
important factor behind the formal or informal wages. Badaoui et al. (2008) find that
in their South African data, the informal wage penalty falls from 37 % to 17.9 % after
taking the unobservables into account. However, just as we showed previously, fixed ef-
fect panel models focus on the effects when transition happens. In our case, this model
only estimates the formal informal job effects for the job movers, or in other words, it
actually only shows the formal informal job effects on wage for the job movers, while
in our data the job stayers account for a larger percentage. There are in total 2802
employees but the data is not balanced panel data, i.e. 530 individuals are surveyed
consistently for 3 waves, 565 individuals for 2 waves and 1707 are reported only once,
so there are altogether 4385 observations in the data. Through those three waves,the
movers only account for less than 10 %, including 87 workers moving from informal
employment to formal employment and 132 from formal to informal. Then the small
sample size might be another reason for the insignificance of the coefficients.
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Table 3.5: Fixed-Effect Panel Data Estimation of Logarithm Hourly Wage
Coeff. p-value
job -.11 .09
Experience .39 .00
East .10 .19
Hukou .17 .25
Health Cond. .01 .95
Type of work unit
government -.22 .03
collective -.11 .18
Establishment size
< 20 -.01 .96
> 100 .03 .71
Type of occupation
Technological -.16 .07
Management -.08 .46
Craft -.06 .43
Interaction Term
I(job.East) -.09 .48
I(job.Hukou) -.04 .61
I(job.Management) .11 .27
I(job.government) .13 .15
I(priv.small) -.21 .03
I(gov.large) -.06 .51
I(tech.gov) .28 .00
I(female.experience) -.05 .57
Constant 1.91 .00
Number of Individuals 2802
Number of Observations 4385
Robustness to Different Model Specifications
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results of the formal wage premium after dropping the
covariates of education levels, establishment size and type of work unit respectively.
The wage premium stays insignificant at 5% level without education in the estima-
60
Table 3.6: Wage premium by kernel matching for different specifications
αMDID St. Err. t-statistic
No Education 1.26 .66 1.92
No Establish. Size .840 .627 1.34
No Type of Work Unit .953 .673 1.42
No Establish. Size & Type of Work Unit 1.46* .634 2.30
Notes: “No .” means “.” is dropped in estimation of wage premium. Asterisks mean
significance at 5% level of t test.
tion.3 This can be explained as that people with different education levels can earn
similarly across the sectors. Those variables significantly could affect the wage level
for both formal and informal employment but add no information in explaining the
wage difference between the two sectors after controlling for other characteristics of
jobs and employees.
It is more interesting to find that dropping either only establishment size or only the
type of work unit does not change the insignificance of wage premium, while cutting
both of them from the model, the premium becomes very significant and positive.
This may be caused by the dependence between the firm size and working unit type,
the correlation of which turns to be 0.35. So in China, usually the government-owned
enterprises are in much larger scale than the private ones. Peng (2007) also concludes
that wage returns to firm size in those enterprises is much larger. Ye et al. (2011)
find that monopoly of some government owned enterprises plays a significant positive
effect on the wage difference with the private firms. Actually both of these two dummy
variables can capture the information of firm sizes. This could be the reason why
dropping only one of those variables makes no difference in the final results. However
without any information about the firm size, a significant wage premium emerges. It
is commonly viewed that larger firms or organizations offer more attractive wage and
better social security in most countries. And size of establishment in the formal sector
3It is significant at the level of 1%. To keep along with the other tests in this paper, we hereby do
not explain the education effect in details.
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tends to be larger. So it follows that without considering the establishment size in
estimation, the wage premium should be significantly positive.
People could interpret the size wage premium as evidence that the labor market is
segmented according to the firm size. Just as mentioned in Section 2 that some studies
also define informal employment as employment in small firms, although this definition
is in our opinion inappropriate and not yet supported by evidence. There are a variety
of papers studying the relation between firm size and wage differentials and many of
them find there is a size effect in explaining the earning gaps. Oi and Idson (1999)
find that in the U.S. men employed in firms with 1,000 or more employees earn 45
% more on average than men employed in firms with fewer than 25 employees. For
women, the ratio is 1.30. And in Japan in 1988, the earnings ratio between firms with
1,000 employees or more and firms with 10 to 99 employees was 1.69 for men, 1.68 for
women. Oosterbeek and van Praag (1995) after comparing wages in large (more than
500 employees) and medium-sized firms (between 20 to 500 employees) in Netherlands
show that the wage difference is one-third due to the fact that large companies are in
a position to attract workers with more favorable endowments, and two-thirds due to
differing wage regimes. Chen et al. (2010) also find that firm size is still significant in
explaining the wage differential after controlling for the externality of China’s labor
market, using data of firms in Zhejiang province in China. Overall our finding of size-
wage premium by semi-parametric method is in line with those in other countries, but
it is seldom considered as evidence of segmentation of labor markets, as the reason for
its existence of this premium is still sparking much debate.
A drawback of this study is the identification of the informal employment. Due to
the data availability, we only took the employees with permanent contracts as formal.
However just as reported by Henley et al. (2006), the probabilities of the temporary
employees and self-employed working formally are not zero. For the short-term em-
ployees, only those with high wage offers are willing to submit taxes under the social
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regulation. So the informal wage penalty could be underestimated by our specification.
3.4 Conclusion
We ask whether individuals formally employed can significantly earn more than those
working informally in China. Using the data from the China Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS), we applied the differences-in-differences propensity score matching
estimator to compare the wages between the formal and informal employees with simi-
lar human and job characteristics. The results tell us that we cannot find any evidence
that the Chinese labor market is segmented along the formal-informal line.
From the descriptive statistics of our data, we can observe that the Chinese formal and
informal employees vary widely in human and job characteristics and there is no ap-
parent wage difference between the two types of employees. Additionally the Chinese
informal workers on average earn slightly more than the formal ones, just as found by
Xin (2001). In order to make our estimation more plausible against the CIA assump-
tion, we proceed to using the combined estimator of the propensity score matching
and differences-in-differences estimator in the main analysis. The results show that
for the workers who move from the informal employment to formal employment, there
is no significant increase or change in wages compared to those who stay as informal
employees. It is worth noting that the estimation of the propensity score by probit
model passes the goodness of fit test, which indicates that the included covariate is
acceptably rich to explain the selection of formal-informal jobs and thus adds some
weight on the plausibility of our causal effects.
In order to check the robustness of our estimator, I also carry out two other methods,
linear regression estimated by OLS and panel data model with fixed effect, the results
of which are similar to those from DID PSM estimator. Together with the results
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by Chen and Hamori (2009), we could conclude that the wage differences can be
mostly explained by the divergence of the human and job characteristics rather than
the different types of job. We also test the sensitivity of the results to difference
model specifications in estimating the propensity scores and conclude that controlling
for the establishment characteristics, such as type of ownership, establishment size,
is important. Larger firms seem to pay more in China and also most countries, and
government-owned enterprises are usually in very large scales, so these two variables
both capture the size effect of wage difference, then at least one of them must be
considered while comparing the wage difference across sectors. In general, as almost
all the results are consistently arguing that we cannot find a significant formal wage
premium for our Chinese data, the strong CIA assumption is somehow fulfilled in our
model and thus the DID PSM estimator is credible.
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Figure 3.2: Kernel Density Estimates
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Proof for Chapter 1
Lemma Suppose:
l = Op(T
1
3 ) (A.1)
Op(l−q) = op(lT−1) (A.2)
we have
q ≥ 2. (*)
Proof From my understanding, l must be a sequence of random variables, rather
than a single random variable. Because the definition of ”the order in probability”
concerns about the convergence of a sequence of random variables. Therefore, I would
like to use lN henceforth. (A.1) and (A.2) then become
lT = Op(T
1
3 ) (A.1’)
Op(l
−q
T ) = op(lTT
−1) (A.2’)
From the definition, (A.1’) could be interpreted as: for any e > 0, there exist a pair
of Me1 , Ne1 such that for all T > Ne1
P{ | lT |
T
1
3
> Me1} < e
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We then immediately claim that there exist a Nb1 > Ne1 such that for all T > Nb1
P{logT(| lT |) >
1
3
} < e (A.3)
(A.3) is indeed true and could be seen by assuming the opposite.
(A.2’) implies that: if HT is a sequence of random variables and HT = Op(l
−q
T ),
HT = op(lTT−1) then must hold. Analogously, HT = Op(l
−q
T ) could be interpreted
as: for any e > 0, there exist a pair of Me2 , Ne2 such that for all T > Ne2
P{ | HT |
l−qT
> Me2} < e (A.4)
We then immediately claim that the above is true is and only if there exist a Nb2 > Ne2
such that for all T > Nb2
P{log|lT |(| HT |) > −q} < e (A.5)
When (A.4) holds, (A.5) is indeed true and could be seen by assuming the opposite.
Let’s now take a look at the opposite direction. When (A.5) holds,
|HT |
l−qT
must be
bounded in the limit in probability, i.e., (A.4) is also true. Therefore, (A.4) and (A.5)
are equivalent. (A.5) is also equivalent to
P{ logT(| HT |)
logT(| lT |)
> −q} < e
or
P{logT(| HT |) > −q logT(| lT |) and logT(| lT |) > 0} < e (A.6)
HT = op(lTT−1) could be interpreted as: for any η > 0, it holds that
P{ lim
T→∞
| HT |
lTT−1
> η} = 1
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We then immediately claim that for any e > 0, there exist a Nb3 such that for all
T > Nb3
P{logT(| HT |) ≥ logT(| lT |)− 1} < e (A.7)
(A.7) is indeed true and could be seen by assuming the opposite. Now define
Nb = max(Nb1 ,Nb2 ,Nb3)
Therefore, (A.3), (A.6) and (A.7) must apply for all T > Nb.
The fact that if HT is a sequence of random variables and HT = Op(l
−q
T ), HT =
op(lTT−1) then must hold, implies that if (A.6) holds, (A.7) is true. We then claim
for all T > Nb,
−q logT(| lT |) < logT(| lT |)− 1
i.e.,
1
1+ q
< logT(| lT |) (A.8)
Combining (A.8) and (A.3), we have for all T > Nb,
P{ 1
1+ q
>
1
3
} < e
i.e.,
P{2 > q} < e (A.9)
We know that q is a constant rather than a random variable. Thus (9)implies (*). 
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Abstract
The first chapter considers the issue that in dynamic panel data models where there is
no cross-sectional dependence, the overidentifying test statistic should be the number
of cross sections times the GMM minimand. Dealing with the unknown autocorrelation
structures of moment conditions, the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) covariance matrix GMM estimator is incorporated, and it is shown that the
bootstrap approximation outperforms the first order approximation. As suggested
by Kapetanios (2008), I construct bootstrap samples by resampling the whole cross
sectional units with replacement instead of block bootstrap. Monte Carlo simulations
show that this bootstrap has good size properties which outperform bootstrap with
Arellano and Bond GMM estimators in all cases based on different settings.
In the second chapter, based on three rounds of Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS), incidence of non-payments for household utilities in Russia has been
analyzed by a number of variables. Taking the influence of the past record of non-
payment into account, a dynamic binary choice panel data model estimated by GMM
methods indicated that the categories of households that are more likely to have non-
payments are those with unpaid records, higher proportion of utility expenditure,
unemployed household head, school-age children, and those living not in a private
apartment or house. Moreover, wage arrears and poverty status of a household appear
to be significant factors affecting existence of utility payment arrears. Estimation
suggests that existence of non-payments for utilities might be both an issue of poverty
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and low willingness to pay higher bills for services of the sector, which has been stopped
being subsidized substantially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The last chapter tests the labor market segmentation hypothesis, i.e. whether workers
formally employed can earn significantly more than those informally employed, us-
ing data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). Instead of parametric
approach which suffers from some econometric problems, the propensity score match-
ing approach is implemented in estimating the formal employment wage premium.
Comparing individuals with similar employee and firm characteristics, it can not be
concluded that formal jobs are superior to informal ones in terms of income. We also
test the robustness of our results for different model specifications and sensitivity to
unobserved covariates.
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Zusammenfassung
Das erste Kapitel befasst sich mit dem Thema, dass in dynamischen Paneldaten-
Modellen, wo es keine Querschnitts-Abha¨ngigkeit gibt, die overidentifying Teststatis-
tik das Produkt aus der Anzahl der Querschnitte und des GMM minimand sein sollte.
Auf die unbekannten Autokorrelation-Strukturen der Moment-Bedingungen eingehend,
werden die Heteroskedastizita¨t und der Autokorrelations-konsistente (HAC) Kovar-
ianzmatrix GMM Scha¨tzer aufgenommen, und es wird gezeigt, dass die Bootstrap
Angleichung die Na¨herung erster Ordnung u¨bertrifft. Wie von Kapetanios (2008)
vorgeschlagen, konstruiere ich Bootstrap-Samples durch Resampling der gesamten
Querschnittseinheiten mit Austausch anstelle von Block Bootstrap. Monte-Carlo-
Simulationen zeigen, dass dieser Bootstrap gute Gro¨sseneigenschaften aufweist, welche
den Bootstrap mit Arellano und Bond GMM Scha¨tzern in allen auf unterschiedlichen
Parametern basierenden Fa¨llen u¨bertrefen.
Im zweiten Kapitel wurde basierend auf drei Runden der russischen Longitudi-
nal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) das Auftreten von Nichtzahlungen fu¨r Haushaltsar-
tikel in Russland anhand einer Reihe von Variablen analysiert. Unter Beru¨cksich-
tigung des Einflusses des vergangenen Zahlungsverhaltens, zeigte ein durch GMM
Methoden gescha¨tztes dynamisches bina¨res Auswahl-Panel-Daten-Modell, dass die
Kategorien der Haushalte, die eine ho¨here Wahrscheinlichkeit von Nichtzahlungen
aufweisen, diejenigen mit Aufzeichnungen von Nichtzahlungen in der Vergangenheit,
einem ho¨heren Anteil von Versorgungsausgaben, einem arbeitslosen Haushaltsvor-
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stand, mit Kindern im Schulalter sowie Bewohner von nicht privatisierten Wohnungen
oder Ha¨usern sind. Daru¨ber hinaus erscheinen Lohnru¨cksta¨nde und Ausmass der Ar-
mut eines Haushalts signifikante Faktoren fu¨r das Auftreten von Zahlungsru¨ckstanden
bei Versorgungsausgaben zu sein. Die Scha¨tzung legt nahe, dass die Existenz von
Nichtzahlungen fu¨r Versorgungsausgaben sowohl eine Frage der Armut als auch der
niedrigen Bereitschaft ist, ho¨here Rechnungen fu¨r Dienstleistungen des Sektors, dessen
umfangreiche Subventionierung nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion gestoppt
wurde, zu zahlen.
Das letzte Kapitel testet die Hypothese der Segmentierung der Arbeitsma¨rkte, das
heisst, ob formell angestellte Arbeitnehmer deutlich mehr als informell Bescha¨ftigte
verdienen, basierend auf Daten aus der China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).
Anstelle eines parametrischen Ansatzes, welcher unter einer Reihe o¨konometrischer
Probleme leidet, wird der Propensity-Score-Matching-Ansatz fu¨r die Scha¨tzung des
Lohnvorteils einer formellen Bescha¨ftigung angewendet. Aus dem Vergleich von
Bescha¨ftigten mit a¨hnlichen perso¨nlichen- und Firmen-Eigenschaften kann nicht die
Schlussfolgerung gezogen werden, dass formell Angestellte den informell Bescha¨ftigten
hinsichtlich der Einkommensho¨he u¨berlegen sind. Ausserdem testen wir die Robus-
theit unserer Ergebnisse fu¨r verschiedene Modell-Spezifikationen und die Sensibilita¨t
fu¨r unbeobachtete Kovarianten.
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